New NASA Would Not Be Worthy of a Great Nation

Seeking a Human Flightflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation

The Augustine Commission, whose above-entitled work is cited by the Obama Administration in attempting to justify the cancellation of Project Constellation, noted in its final report, in relevant part:

"A human landing and extended human presence on Mars stand prominently above all other opportunities for exploration. [...] Mars is unquestionably the most scientifically interesting destination in the inner solar system. It possesses resources which can be used for life support and propellants. If humans are ever to live for long periods with intention of extended settlement on another planetary surface, it is likely to be on Mars. But Mars is not an easy place to visit with existing technology and without a substantial investment in resources."

The Commission then extensively examined options for human spaceflight beyond low-Earth orbit, settling on the Flexible Path option, which at a minimum preserved the Orion aspect of Project Constellation.

Under President Obama's proposal, Orion, along with the rest of Project Constellation, would be cancelled.

It is worth noting that the cancellation would change NASA's direction yet again despite substantial developmental costs already expended toward implementation of Project Constellation. Although it said that sunk costs can only be one factor to be considered, the Commission warned against constant changes in NASA's objectives:

"Significant space achievements require continuity of support over many years. One way to assure that no successes are achieved is to continually introduce change. Changes to ongoing programs should be made only for compelling reasons. NASA and its human spaceflight program are in need of stability, having been redirected several times in the last decade."

The Commission warned that changes to Project Constellation carried significant risks, and, among other consequences, entail the loss of existing workforce resources and human expertise. Significantly, despite its concerns about the escalating costs of Ares I, it flatly noted that terminating Ares I would cause programmatic disruption.

Alternatives to Project Constellation?

The Commission's report emphasized that a super-heavy lifter with a rating similar to Ares V would be required. By contrast, the President's proposal omits any programmatic funding for any such lifter other than a vague aspiration toward "next-generation" technologies.

The Commission's recommendations on commercial spaceflight made no mention of private provision of such launchers, and for good reason: Most of those knowledgeable in the field admit that commercial spaceflight cannot operate beyond low-Earth orbit and, moreover, have no generally recognized investment interest to in doing so. Development of an Ares V-class launcher would have no basis in private industry. Even the claims of a private industry lobbying group draw the line at going beyond a few hundred miles beyond the Earth:

"We have a tremendous opportunity here to jump-start private activity in low-Earth orbit that will further lower the cost of access to space and unleash the economic potential of space long promised."

Even aside from considerations relating to super-heavy lift vehicles, commercial options for low-Earth orbital operations, the Commission noted, should be pursued only if there is accelerated development toward a human-rated heavy-lift vehicle.

Contrary to the Commission's findings, the Administration's proposal for NASA, however, contains no such acceleration and in fact would terminate the Ares program without providing for any substitute.

The Commission also noted that a commonly cited alternative to Project Constellation, reliance on the Defense Department's Delta IV and Atlas V vehicles (also known as Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, or EELV's), incurred significant costs:

"Because of these realignment costs, the EELV-heritage super heavy does not become available significantly sooner than the Ares V or Shuttle-derived families of launchers. The transition to this way of doing business would come at the cost of cutting deeply into a the internal NASA capability to develop and operate launchers, both in terms of skills and facilities."

Nor does the Administration's proposal contain any funding for even this alternative.

Not Worthy

In short, President Obama's budgetary proposal would cancel NASA's means to achieve the goals cited by the Augustine Commission. It would seek private means of achieving low-Earth orbital operations but essentially delay programmatic commitment toward any human spaceflight beyond that threshold.

If the Administration had its way, NASA would no longer have in mind the objectives the Commission saw were worthy of a great nation.

Sources consulted:

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalReport.pdf

http://www.commercialspaceflight.org/?cat=27